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According to the resemblance account of ’what it’s like’ and similar constructions,
a sentence such as ‘there is something it’s like to have a toothache’ means ‘there is
something having a toothache resembles’. This account has proved controversial in
the literature; some writers endorse it, many reject it. We show that this conflict is
illusory. Drawing on the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, we show that there
are two versions of the resemblance account, depending on whether ‘resembles’ is
construed notionally or relationally. While well-known criticisms of the resemblance
account undermine its relational version, they do not touch its notional version. On
the contrary, the notional version is equivalent to various accounts usually interpreted
as rivals to resemblance. We end by noting that this resolution of the controversy (a)
explains why ‘like’, which is a comparative, appears in a construction that concerns the
properties of events, and (b) removes any pressure to suppose that ‘like’ is ambiguous
between a comparative and a non-comparative sense.
1. Introduction
Sentences that contain the phrase ‘what it’s like’, and variants on that phrase, are
ubiquitous in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies. But what do they
mean exactly?
According to the resemblance or comparative account, ‘like’ in ‘what it’s like’
means ‘resembles’ or ‘similar to’. So, if we take ‘there is something it is like to
have a toothache’ as our exemplar, the resemblance account entails that:
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(1) ‘There is something it is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c if
and only if there is something having a toothache resembles in c.
This account is natural and straightforward; ‘like’ does mean ‘resembles’, at least
it often does (see D’Arcy [2017]). So it is not surprising to find the resemblance
account endorsed in the literature—a recent example being Gaskin [2017]. But
many writers on the subject, including Nagel in the paper that is the main source
of this literature, reject it as implausible [see Nagel, 1974, fn. 6]; for them, ‘like’
in ‘what it’s like’ sentences does not mean ‘resembles’.1
We will argue that this dispute over the resemblance account is illusory; it
neglects the fact that there are two different versions of the resemblance view.
The word ‘resembles’ is an intensional transitive verb, which means it is seman-
tically similar to verbs such as ‘hunts’, ‘seeks’, ‘wants’ and so on. Such verbs
induce two readings—the notional and relational readings, as they are usually
called—of sentences in which they occur. In turn, this yields two versions of
the resemblance account. The relational version is indeed implausible, just as
Nagel and others maintain, but the notional version is not. Indeed, far from be-
ing implausible, the notional version comes in forms that are equivalent to the
accounts endorsed by critics of the resemblance view. The moral of the story is
that in reality there is no opposition between the resemblance account and these
rivals: critics of the resemblance account are right about the relational version,
proponents are right about the notional version.
2. Two Versions of the Resemblance Account
Let us start by providing further detail about the idea that ‘resembles’ is an
intensional transitive verb and so gives rise to two versions of the resemblance
account. Consider (2):
(2) Alice resembles a member of the intervarsity basketball team.
On its relational reading, if (2) is true, there must be—i.e. there must exist—a
particular member of the intervarsity basketball team such that Alice resembles
that person. On the notional reading, by contrast, this need not be the case; Alice
1See also Lewis [1988], Hellie [2004], Stoljar [2016], among many others.
Two Notions of Resemblance and the Semantics of ’What it’s Like’ · 3
may resemble a member of the intervarsity basketball team even though no such
member exists—imagine all members accidentally vaporized by the Space Force,
for example. Likewise, Alice may resemble a member of the team, even though
there is no particular member she resembles.
The same thing is true when we adopt, as in (3), explicitly quantificational
versions of such sentences.
(3) Alice resembles something.2
On its relational reading, if (3) is true, there must exist a particular thing such
that Alice resembles that thing. On its notional reading, however, this need not
be the case; Alice may resemble something even if she is the only existing thing
in the universe.
If resemblance works this way in general, it works this way in the resem-
blance account. The relational version, as we will call it, entails that:
(4) ‘There is something it is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c if
and only if there exists, in c, an x such that having a toothache resembles
x.
The notional version, by contrast, entails that:
(5) ‘There is something it is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c if
and only if having a toothache resembles something in c.
The difference is that the relational version, but not the notional version, has our
sentence requiring for its truth some distinct thing—that is, some thing distinct
from having a toothache—that then bears the relation of resemblance to having a
toothache. The right-hand side of (4) contains an ordinary existential quantifier,
while the right-hand side of (5) contains a quantifier that replaces a noun phrase
that may be interpreted non-specifically. The quantifier in (5) is the quantifier at
issue in the inference from ‘Alice resembles a member of the basketball team—
but no particular one’ to ‘Alice resembles something’.
But what is the correct analysis of the notional reading of ‘resembles’, and
2Occurrences of ‘something’ in intensional positions are what Friederike Moltmann [1997,
2003, 2008] calls special quantifiers, which differ from ordinary objectual quantifiers in that they
do not replace expressions whose function is to refer—they are ‘non-nominal quantifiers’.
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the non-specific noun-phrases that accompany it? The most well-known seman-
tics for ‘resembles’ has been developed by Zimmermann [1993]. On a view of
this sort, the notional reading of ‘John resembles a pig,’ for example, has the
following analysis:
(6) ‘John resembles a pig’ is true in a context c if and only if John has, in c,
some property or properties characteristic of pigs.3
Adapting this to our examples, (2) is true on the notional reading just in case Al-
ice has some property or properties characteristic of members of the basketball
team, while (3) is true just in case she has some property or properties character-
istic of something—anything at all.
Likewise, applying this analysis to the notional resemblance account, given
in (5), yields:
(7) ‘There is something it is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c
if and only if having a toothache has, in c, some property or properties
characteristic of something.
Thus, as the name suggests, the relational resemblance account involves an event
bearing a relation of resemblance to some other thing. By contrast, the notional
version does not involve a relation at all, but rather involves that event having
certain contextually relevant properties.
3. The Case Against Resemblance
Given that there are two versions of the resemblance account, we now face two
questions. First, when Nagel and others reject the resemblance account, which
3Here we paraphrase Zimmermann slightly, for readability. His analysis is presented
formally by Meier [2009] as follows: ‘John resembles a pig’ is true iff there is a possibly complex
property P∗ such that
1.P∗(John), and
2.For all y, if y is a prototypical representative of pigs, then P ∗ (y).
On analyses of this sort, John can resemble a pig even if there are no pigs; all that is required is
that he has certain properties. Meier then goes on to develop this analysis to accommodate
the fact that ‘resembles’ is not only an intensional transitive verb, but also a multidimensional
comparative. On her view, ‘resembles’ is a multidimensional intensional comparative.
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version are they rejecting? Second, even if they are right to reject one version, do
their objections threaten the other version as well?
The relational/notional distinction has never been explicitly drawn in the
literature on these issues, so answers to these questions are to some extent spec-
ulative. Nevertheless, it is most plausible, when examining existing criticisms
of the resemblance account, to make the following trio of points: (a) these crit-
icisms focus exclusively on the relational version; (b) they are prima facie plau-
sible against that version; and yet (c) they are implausible against the notional
version.
Let’s illustrate this by looking at two well-known discussions of the resem-
blance view, one by David Lewis, the other by Benj Hellie. Lewis writes:
A literalist might see the phrase ‘know what it’s like’ and take that to
mean ‘know what it resembles’. Then he might ask ‘what’s so hard
about that? Why can’t you just be told which experiences resemble
one another?’ ... This misses the point. Pace the literalist, ‘know
what it’s like’ does not mean ‘know what it resembles’. Lewis [1988,
pp. 78-80]
Versions of (a)-(c) clearly apply here. Concerning (a), Lewis talks of experiences
resembling one another, which strongly indicates that he takes resemblance to
be a relation either between particular entities or types of entities. After all, a
sentence such as ’the marbles resemble each other’ is most naturally read as
being true if and only if there are some marbles which stand in various relations
of resemblance to each other.
Concerning (b), Lewis’s argument against the resemblance view starts from
the premise that it is possible for one to know everything that a thing resembles
without knowing what it’s like: "I don’t know any better what it’s like to taste
Vegemite when I’m told that it tastes like Marmite, because I don’t know what
Marmite tastes like either" [Lewis, 1988, p. 80]. But, the argument continues, if
’knowing what it’s like’ just meant ’knowing what it resembles’, this situation
would be impossible. Hence the resemblance view is false.
If we understand Lewis’s premise as a claim about what relations of resem-
blance a thing stands in, his reasoning has prima facie force. Admittedly, it may
be questioned; Marmite is only one thing that Vegemite resembles, not every-
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thing. But Lewis presumably thinks that what holds in the case where Vegemite
resembles Marmite likewise holds no matter what relations of resemblance Veg-
emite stands in. Insofar as this generalization is legitimate, his argument against
the relational resemblance view is successful.
Concerning (c), while Lewis’s reasoning may have force against the relational
resemblance view, it has none against the notional resemblance view. On the no-
tional reading, resemblance is not a relation, but instead may involve properties
of any type, relational or otherwise. Hence Lewis’s premise, understood in that
way, is equivalent to the claim that it is possible to know absolutely every prop-
erty a thing has without knowing what it is like. But that is clearly mistaken.
Thus, the notional resemblance view is untouched by the argument.
Turning now to Hellie, he writes:
[W]hen one asks ‘what is San Francisco like?’ it is appropriate to
respond with a string of predicates, such as ‘dense, hilly, and ex-
pensive’. The comparative question would be more appropriately
answered with a string of NPs (Noun Phrases), such as ‘uranium,
Ithaca, and cuts from the tenderloin’. In certain contexts, this might
be an apt answer, but in most, it would be bizarre. [Hellie, 2004, pp.
339-340]
Once again, versions of (a)-(c) apply. Concerning (a), that Hellie is interested in
the relational resemblance view is shown by the fact he considers ‘Ithaca’ an an-
swer to the comparative question. ‘Ithaca’ denotes a specific, existing, particular,
and when such an expression occurs in the complement of ‘is like’—as in ‘San
Francisco is like Ithaca’—‘like’ can only have its relational resemblance reading.
Concerning (b), Hellie’s argument is a good one against the relational version.
When we ask ‘what is X like?’ we are often asking for a response given with
various predicates; as he points out, the question ‘what is it like?’ is nearly
synonymous with the question ’how is it?’, and the latter can be aptly answered
by specifying the properties that an object has. But responses to this question that
make use of referring expressions, such as ‘Ithaca’, and so force the relational
reading, seem bizarre.
Finally, concerning (c), Hellie’s objections put no pressure at all on the no-
tional resemblance account; on the contrary, they seem to count in its favor. On
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that account, ‘what is X like?’ asks for some of X’s contextually relevant prop-
erties, and such properties are specified with predicates, just as Hellie points
out.
Our suggestion that the arguments of Lewis and Hellie are subject to an anal-
ysis of this form may be strengthened by noting that parallel remarks apply in the
case of many discussions of resemblance in philosophy, quite apart from ‘what
it’s like.’ To take just one example, consider Goodman’s classic argument against
resemblance analyses of representation. Goodman argues that resemblance has
the wrong logical features to serve as an analysis of representation:
unlike representation, resemblance is symmetric: B is as much like
A as A is like B, but while a painting may represent the Duke of
Wellington, the Duke does not represent the painting. [Goodman,
1976, p. 6]
Goodman’s suggestion is surely correct when considered as a point about rela-
tional resemblance: relational resemblance is symmetrical, while representation
is not. But when considered as a point about notional resemblance, it is uncon-
vincing. In the notional sense, resemblance is not a relation at all, so it is clearly
not a symmetrical relation.
4. The Resemblance Account and the Property Account
We have argued that there are two versions of the resemblance account, and
that the case against that account works only against its relational version. At
this point, one may wonder how the notional resemblance account compares to
various competitors that have been proposed in the literature.
Many writers who reject the resemblance account favor what has come to be
called ‘the property account’, which entails that:
(8) ‘There is something it is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c if
and only if there is, in c, some property F such that having a toothache
has F.
It is easy to show, however, that this view is equivalent to the notional resem-
blance account. We saw above that on a Zimmerman-style analysis of ‘resem-
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bles’, the notional resemblance account comes out as (7): ‘there is something it
is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context c if and only if having a toothache
has in that context some property or properties characteristic of something. But
the right-hand side of (7) entails the right-hand side of (8): if you have in a con-
text a property F that is characteristic of something, you have in that context a
property F. Conversely the right-hand side of (8) entails the right-hand side of
(7): if you have in a context a property F, then you have in that context a property
characteristic of something (for example things that are F). Thus, the right hand
side of (8) is equivalent to the right hand side of (7); more generally, the property
account and the notional resemblance account are equivalent.
If the notional resemblance account and the property account are equivalent,
there is no need to choose between them. If you say ‘I reject the resemblance
account but support the property account’, what you say is plausible only if
what you have in mind is the relational version of the resemblance account. But
if what you have in mind is the notional version, you contradict yourself.
5. The Resemblance Account and the Affective Account
The property account is equivalent to the notional resemblance account, but it
does not follow that either view is correct as it stands. On the contrary, the recent
literature on these issues has brought to light at least two features of ‘what it’s
like’ and its variants that are hard for the property view (and so the notional
resemblance view) to explain.
First, ‘what it’s like’ sentences have a distinctive pattern of usage in which
(a) they are characteristically used to report experiences and yet (b) they also
permit non-experiential uses, as when we ask ‘What will it be like for the UK to
leave the EU?’ (see Snowdon [2010]). Some views of ‘what it is like’ have a good
account of feature (a) but no account of feature (b). Others, such as the property
view, have a good account of (b) but have difficulty explaining (a).4
Second, the property view neglects the fact that ‘what it’s like’ sentences, at
least as they occur in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, have an
extra structural feature. For we may ask not only what it is like for Bill to go
bungee jumping, but also what it is like for Mary for Bill to go bungee jumping,
4For discussion of this point, see Stoljar [2016].
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or, as we may put it to avoid a confusing repetition, what it is like to Mary for
Bill to go bungee jumping. (Suppose that Mary gets anxious whenever Bill goes
bungee jumping.) In such cases we have two subjects not one: Bill is the subject
of the infinitival clause ‘to go bungee jumping’—he is the agent of the event of
bungee jumping. Mary, on the other hand, is the subject of the finite clause ‘what
it is like for Bill to go bungee jumping’—she is the experiencer (as we might put
it, following the usage of such linguists as Gisborne [2010]) of the event of Bill’s
going bungee jumping.
The affective account, recently suggested by Stoljar [2016], is designed to ac-
commodate both features. On this view, to revert to our original example, ‘there
is something it is like to have a toothache’ has as its logical form the following:
‘there is something it is like to x for y to have a toothache’. The view then entails:
(9) ‘There is something it is like to x for y to have a toothache’ is true in a
context c if and only if there is, in c, some way W such that y’s having a
toothache affects x in way W.
This account separates in principle the agent of the event of having a toothache
and the experiencer of that event—the agent affected by the having of the toothache.
Hence it accommodates the second of the two features just noted. Further, since
the affecting relation at issue here is something that is characteristically experi-
ential but not necessarily so, it explains the first feature.
The affective account does not deny that sentences containing ‘what it’s like’
concern properties. Both the property view and the affective account agree that
‘there is something is like to have a toothache’ is true in a context only if having a
toothache has a property in that context. But the affective account goes further in
requiring that the property in question be of specific sort, namely, the property
of affecting a subject in a contextually relevant way. Hence we may say that the
affective account is equivalent to a restricted version of the property account, a
version in which the properties in question are required to be of a certain sort.
What is the relation between the affective account and the resemblance ac-
count? If, as we saw above, the notional resemblance account is equivalent to
the property account, and if, as we have just seen, the affective account is equiv-
alent to a restricted version of the property account, it follows that the affective
account is in turn equivalent to a restricted version of the notional resemblance
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account.
To illustrate this, notice that typically things resemble not as such but in var-
ious respects. John may resemble a pig, for example, in respect of how he eats
but not how he looks. If so, on a Zimmermann-style analysis, John has proper-
ties that are characteristic, not of pigs in general, but of pigs in respect of how
they eat. Likewise, when we ask, ‘What is it like to Mary for Bill to go bungee
jumping?’ we are not simply asking, ‘What does Bill’s going bungee jumping re-
semble?’ We are rather asking, ‘What does Bill’s going bungee jumping resemble
in respect of how it affects Mary?’
These observations permit us to formulate a restricted version of the notional
account that is equivalent to the affective account formulated in (9) above. This
is as follows:
(10) ‘There is something it is like to x for y to have a toothache’ is true in a
context c if and only if, in c, y’s having a toothache resembles something
in respect of how it affects x.
To see that these are equivalent, recall that, on the Zimmermann-style analysis,
an event resembles something in respect of how it affects x just in case it has
properties that are characteristic of something that affects x. If so, the right-hand
side of (9) entails the right-hand side of (10): if in a context there is some way
that having a toothache affects someone, then in that context having a toothache
has the properties characteristic of something that affects someone. Conversely,
the right-hand side of (10) entails the right-hand side of (9): if in a context having
a toothache has the properties characteristic of something that affects someone,
then in that context there is some way that having a toothache affects someone.
We saw before that the property view is equivalent to the notional resem-
blance view; what we have now seen is that the affective view is in turn equiva-
lent to a restricted version of the notional resemblance view (mutatis mutandis,
a restricted version of the property view). If you say ‘I reject the resemblance ac-
count but support the affective account’, what you say is plausible only if what
you have in mind is the relational resemblance account. But if what you have in
mind is the notional resemblance account, you contradict yourself, at any rate if
it is restricted in the way suggested.
Two Notions of Resemblance and the Semantics of ’What it’s Like’ · 11
6. Conclusion
Our proposal has been that ‘resembles’ is an intensional transitive verb and hence
that there are two versions of the resemblance account of ‘what it is like’. The
relational version of the account is implausible, but the notional version is not;
indeed it has a version that is equivalent to the property account, and a more
restricted version that is equivalent to the affective account.
What consequences may be drawn from our discussion? The main conse-
quence is that it is a mistake to assume, as is often done in the literature, that the
resemblance account stands in opposition to these alternatives. In reality there is
no conflict at all. But there are two further related consequences that are worth
pointing out. The first concerns an apparently puzzling feature of questions of
the form ‘what is it like?’, namely, that ‘like’ here seems to be a resemblance or
comparative notion, and yet the question seems equivalent to ‘how is it?’, which,
as Hellie emphasized, asks about something’s properties. Once we recognize
that there is a notional reading of ‘resembles’, this puzzle dissolves. The no-
tional reading of ‘what is it like?’ can ask about a resemblance by asking for a
property.
The second consequence concerns a response to the fact that ‘like’ has these
two uses, namely, that ‘like’ is ambiguous between a comparative and a non-
comparative sense. Our discussion suggests there is no need to posit such an
ambiguity. It is common in the literature on the semantics of intensional tran-
sitive verbs to treat the distinction between the relational and notional readings
as a distinction in scope.5 If this approach is correct, the relational and notional
versions of the resemblance account will likewise employ two different scopal
readings of the same construction. In that case, ‘what it’s like’ will be no more
ambiguous than ‘what Mary seeks.’
5The traditional statement of this view comes from Montague [1974], who derived the
relational reading of sentences involving ITVs using a special rule of quantifying in, together
with a type-shift. Montague’s view has been widely, although not universally, adopted.
Proponents of similar analyses include Quine [1956], Zimmermann [1993, 2006], and Richard
[2000], among many others. Fodor [1970] criticises scopal analyses of the different readings of
attitude verbs on the grounds that scope cannot generate all of the available readings. But even
those who do not think that the notional/relational distinction is a scopal one accept that the
distinction does not arise from a lexical ambiguity in the verb—verbs such as ‘seek’, ‘need’, and
‘owe’ are not lexically ambiguous. Our point in the text is that the same is true for ‘resemble’.
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